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NOT YOUR OLDER BROTHER’S BONDS:
THE USE AND REGULATION OF SOCIALIMPACT BONDS IN THE UNITED STATES
KEVIN W. HUMPHRIES*
For one thing, missions
I would thoroughly reform. Missions I would quicken with the
1
Wall street spirit.
Herman Melville

I
INTRODUCTION
Of the many pressing issues facing the United States, juvenile delinquency—
especially the rate at which juvenile delinquents recidivate—is one of the most
troubling. In New York, for example, sixty-three percent of juveniles released
2
from a state corrections facility are rearrested within two years of release. And
the long-term numbers are worse: By the time they reach their twenty-eighth
birthday, eighty-nine percent of (formerly) juvenile males and eighty-one
3
percent of such females will have been rearrested.
But what is one to do? Recidivism, like homelessness, is a seemingly
endemic problem requiring a top-down, comprehensive solution that private
charitable donation would likely fail to produce. And, in a stuttering economy,
4
individuals and companies may lack extra capital to donate to charity —
especially if the tax benefits of such donations are unavailable.
So, it seems, government must step in to address problems such as juveniledelinquent recidivism. Indeed, governments have a substantial financial interest
in reducing the amount of juvenile crime, which accounted for $7 to $8 billion in
5
U.S. government spending in 2007. Yet governments suffer in recessions too,
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3. Id.
4. See ROB REICH & CHRISTOPHER WIMER, CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE GREAT
RECESSION 2 (2012), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/recessiontrends/cgi-bin/web/
sites/all/themes/barron/pdf/CharitableGiving_fact_sheet.pdf (“[T]he economic downturn of 2008 has
given rise to one of the largest year-over-year declines in charitable giving since the late 1960s.”).
5. MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS TO THE
US 33 (2012), available at http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-Innovation/
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and accordingly may lack the resources necessary to adequately address social
problems—especially those of politically powerless groups like at-risk youth.
Thus, if neither private philanthropy nor the government can afford to fix the
problem, are we simply out of options? Perhaps not.
Social-impact bonds (SIBs) may be the answer. SIBs are new financial
instruments in which private investors bear the financial risk of social-welfare
programs. As will be seen, SIBs provide a mechanism by which governments
can infuse private sector social initiatives with powerful financial incentives. In
this note, I explore the potential use and regulation of SIBs in the marketplace.
I argue that the promising and potentially widespread use of SIBs to fund
innovative programs targeted at important social issues poses challenging policy
questions about how—if at all—the SIB market should be regulated.
II
SOCIAL-IMPACT BONDS
Like traditional government or municipal bonds, SIBs—also known as pay
for success bonds—utilize private capital to fund government projects. Unlike
traditional municipal bonds, in which the private investor receives a fixed return
on her investment, in a SIB structure the return to the private investor is
6
contingent on the “success” of the program. Moreover, in the case of a SIB,
repayment of principal to the investor is also contingent. On the other hand, all
parties stand to gain financially and otherwise if the SIB-funded project is
successful: Investors might receive a return on their investments, governments
might realize net savings, and, most importantly, constituents will (certainly)
receive needed social services.
A. SIB Basics
The three parties discussed above—government, private entity, and
society—are not the only stakeholders involved in a SIB. Indeed, “[t]here are
seven stakeholder groups involved in a SIB: constituents (the direct
beneficiaries of the social services), government, nonprofit service providers,
investors, intermediaries (responsible for overall SIB project management),
evaluation advisors (to help monitor and refine the program), and independent
7
assessors (to determine if SIB targets are met).” Among this group, the
intermediary plays perhaps the most important role in a traditional SIB: It
“raises capital from investors, selects the service providers, contracts with [the]
government, works with the evaluation adviser and the independent assessor to
set and measure performance targets, and partners with the evaluation adviser
8
to monitor and analyze interim results and suggest midcourse corrections.”
McKinsey_Social_Impact_Bonds_Report.pdf.
6. Success is usually defined by some benchmark of government savings resulting from the
program’s implementation.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id.; see also JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT
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Typically, the intermediary will have experience in the implementation and
9
evaluation of social-welfare programs similar to the one the SIB is financing.
The intermediary’s experience and expertise thus make it a more efficient
option for governments than contracting with parties directly.
If, as a result of the social-welfare program, the government realizes a
predetermined benchmark of savings, the investor recoups his or her principal
10
plus some additional amount. Often this percentage can vary depending upon
the amount of money the government saves as a result of the program: The
11
more money saved, the higher the rate of return.
B. The SIB Marketplace
12

Though ever-increasing in popularity, SIBs are nonetheless a relatively
13
new phenomenon: The first one began in Britain in 2010. Indeed, at the time
of this note’s writing, only a handful of SIB arrangements have been finalized in
the United States, none having existed long enough to provide any kind of
initial statistical results.
Because of the way SIBs are structured, SIB use lends itself most readily to
programs addressing certain types of social problems. Payment to investors in
SIBs is contingent upon numerical success rates, so the outcome of any SIBfunded program must be reliably measurable. For example, recidivism is an
easily traceable, binary construct that allows for such measurement. Also, to
allow for liquidity, results of any SIB-funded program must be available within
14
a relatively short period—usually five years or less. McKinsey & Company

BONDS 2 (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/
social_impact_bonds.pdf (“Under the social impact bond model, a government contracts with a privatesector financing intermediary we’ll call a ‘social impact bond-issuing organization,’ or SIBIO, to obtain
social services. . . . The bond issuer obtains operating funds by issuing bonds to private investors who
provide upfront capital in exchange for a share of the government payments that become available if
the performance targets are met. The bond issuer uses these operating funds to contract with service
providers to deliver the services necessary to meet the performance targets.”).
9. MDRC, for example, is a prototypical intermediary for a SIB. See About MDRC, MDRC,
http://www.mdrc.org/about/about-mdrc-overview-0 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
10. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 5, at 7.
11. See SOCIAL FINANCE, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: RETHINKING FINANCE FOR SOCIAL
OUTCOMES 6 (2009), available at http://payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/sf_rethinkingfinance.pdf
(“[O]utcome payments may increase with successive percentage point improvements in the target
outcome in recognition of the increasing marginal cost (and benefit) of each incremental
improvement.”).
12. See Caroline Preston, Getting Back More Than a Warm Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at
F1 (“Since [the first SIB], the social impact bond idea has spread at a pace that has surprised some in
the slow-moving world of philanthropy.”).
13. Id; see also MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 5, at 11 (noting that, at the time of the report’s
publication, “the UK pilot [was] the world’s one and only SIB”).
14. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 5, at 25; see also Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription
Cure Social Ills?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 12, 2012) (“SIBs are best suited for programs where
results can be evaluated in a couple of years. . . . ‘If you need to wait 10 years to see if the goal was hit,
that is not a good project for a SIB.’”), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/social-impactbonds-can-a-market-prescription-cure-social-ills/.
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suggests that SIBs are “especially well suited to scale interventions focused on
behavior change,” but recognizes that “all the potential applications have not
15
been fully explored.”
16
In addition to recidivism, SIBs have been proposed or enacted by
17
18
governments to address homelessness,
disadvantaged youth,
school
19
20
attendance and other family-related issues, out-of-home child care, and
21
asthma treatment. Federally, the Obama administration has launched a
number of pilot SIBs (called pay for success programs) in the areas of “criminal
22
justice and workforce development.” Notably, “[t]he President’s 2013 Budget
reserves a total of up to $109 million to test this new financing mechanism in a
23
broader range of areas including education and homelessness.”
C. SIBs in Action
1. Peterborough, United Kingdom
The world’s first social impact bond was launched in September 2010 in
24
Peterborough, Cambridgeshire. The Ministry of Justice contracted with Social
Finance, a nonprofit intermediary, to provide a set of interventions over a sixyear period to three thousand short-sentenced male prisoners released from the
15. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 5, at 12.
16. Social-impact bonds aimed toward reducing recidivism have been initiated by a number of
countries, cities, and municipalities. See, e.g., Press Release, Mass. Exec. Office for Admin. & Fin.,
Mass. First State in the Nation to Announce Initial Successful Bidders for ‘Pay for Success’ Contracts
(Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/anf/press-releases/fy2013/massachusetts-first-state-inthe-nation-to-announce-ini.html (announcing such a program in Massachusetts); discussion infra Part
II.C.1 (Peterborough, United Kingdom); discussion infra Part II.C.2 (Rikers Island, New York City).
17. See Press Release, Mass. Exec. Office for Admin. & Fin., supra note 16.
18. See David Ainsworth, Two New Social Impact Bond-Style Investments Launched, THIRD
SECTOR ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/Finance/article/1113538/Two-new-socialimpact-bond-style-investments-launched/?HAYILC=RELATED.
19. See Kaye Wiggins, Office for Civil Society to Trial £40m Social Impact Bond Scheme to Support
‘Problem Families,’ THIRD SECTOR ONLINE (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/
1087083/.
20. See Joint Media Release, New S. Wales Treasury, NSW Government Announces Joint
Development Phase for Social Benefit Bonds (March 20, 2012), available at
http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/21786/NSW_Government_Announces_Join
t_Development_Phase_for_Social_Benefit_Bonds_20-3-12.pdf.
21. See Manuela Badawy, California City Seeks to Cut Asthma Rate via Bond Issue, REUTERS,
(Oct. 19, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-investing-impactbonds-healthidUSBRE89I0U120121019.
22. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 45 (2012).
23. Id.
24. SOCIAL FINANCE, A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS CAN
MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 9 (2011) [hereinafter SOCIAL FINANCE, A
NEW
TOOL
FOR
SCALING
IMPACT],
available
at
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/
sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFinanceWPSingleFINAL_0.pdf; see also SOCIAL FINANCE,
SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: THE ONE* SERVICE. ONE YEAR ON (2011) [hereinafter SOCIAL FINANCE,
THE ONE* SERVICE], available at http://socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/
sf_peterborough_one__year_on.pdf.
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25

Peterborough prison. Social Finance raised a total of £5 million from
26
27
seventeen investors, including, for example, the Rockefeller Foundation.
The interventions provided to each prisoner—the collection of which Social
Finance has termed “One* Service”—are administered by a number of
nonprofit social organizations, such as the YMCA, and include “housing and
employment assistance, accessing drug and alcohol addiction recovery services
28
as well as mentoring and behavioral support.” The arrangement’s objective is
to achieve a reduction in reconviction among the prisoners and a concomitant
savings by the Ministry of Justice as a result of such interventions. If, among
29
former Peterborough prisoners, reconviction events —offenses committed
within a twelve-month period following release—fall by 7.5% or more,
30
investors will receive a return on their investment. The size of such return
increases as reconviction drops below 7.5%, with a maximum return of 13% per
31
year over the eight-year period of the “bond.” Payments are to be made in the
fourth, sixth, and eighth years, but are conditioned on meeting the benchmarks
based on outcomes achieved from working with the prisoners during the
32
preceding two-year period. This determination is to be monitored and made
33
by an independent, third-party evaluator.
Whereas, in a traditional SIB model, the return paid to investors would be
drawn directly from savings realized by the government as a result of the
reduction in recidivism, in this case the Big Lottery Fund—responsible for
delivering UK lottery proceeds to “good causes”—agreed to fund the outcome
34
payments to the investors. Though interim data for the Peterborough SIB is
35
not yet available, early data suggest that the program is achieving some
36
success.
2. Rikers Island, New York City
The contract for the United States’ first social impact bond, also aimed at
37
reducing recidivism, was finalized in late summer 2012 in New York City. This
25. SOCIAL FINANCE, THE ONE* SERVICE, supra note 24, at 7.
26. Id.
27. SOCIAL FINANCE, A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT, supra note 24, at 9.
28. SOCIAL FINANCE, THE ONE* SERVICE, supra note 24, at 32.
29. Importantly, the reconviction events “are not being measured by a binary measure (whether
the offenders reoffend) but rather by a frequency measure (the combined number of reconviction
events),” which “encourages the providers from the One* Service to work with all clients, including
those who are the most prolific reoffenders.” Id. at 10.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id.
32. LIEBMAN, supra note 8, at 13.
33. SOCIAL FINANCE, THE ONE* SERVICE, supra note 24, at 10.
34. Id. at 7, 31.
35. See LIEBMAN, supra note 8, at 13 (noting the “four-year lag between the start of the service
period and the first potential payment” in order to deliver services, measure recidivism, and analyze the
data).
36. See SOCIAL FINANCE, THE ONE* SERVICE, supra note 24, at 16.
37. David W. Chen, Goldman to Invest in City Jail Program, Profiting if Recidivism Falls Sharply,
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SIB paired Goldman Sachs and the New York City Department of Correction
in an effort to reduce juvenile recidivism at Rikers Island, a jail facility in New
38
York City. Goldman Sachs committed $9.6 million to pay for MDRC, the
intermediary, to develop and oversee a rehabilitation program for juveniles
39
released from Rikers Island. If recidivism drops by more than ten percent,
Goldman will be repaid its principle in full; if recidivism drops even further,
40
Goldman stands to make as much as $2.1 million in profit.
The intermediary for the Rikers Island SIB, MDRC, is a nonprofit group
that specializes in implementation and statistical evaluation of social-welfare
41
initiatives. Thus, for example, a private philanthropy might ask MDRC to
create, and subsequently evaluate the success of, a program tailored toward that
philanthropy’s charitable goals. Or, a government body might ask MDRC to
evaluate the impact of a certain program it initiated through legislation. MDRC
focuses on the areas of education, disconnected youth, work and income
42
security, families and children, and health and disability. The Rikers Island
43
SIB is the first SIB in which MDRC has taken part.
One thing that differentiates the Rikers Island SIB from the traditional SIB
model is that whereas in the traditional SIB model all of the investor’s money is
at risk, in the Rikers Island project Goldman stands to lose only up to $2.4
million. Bloomberg Philanthropies—former Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s
charitable foundation—has guaranteed a $7.2 million loan to MDRC, which will
be used to repay Goldman if the program does not meet the ten-percent
44
benchmark. If the program does succeed, however, Goldman will recoup its
principle, plus interest, from the New York City Department of Correction, and
45
MDRC may retain the Bloomberg money for future SIB projects.
As in the Peterborough Project, the intermediary (here MDRC) contracted
with nonprofit organizations to provide the rehabilitation services, and with an
46
independent third party to provide program evaluation.

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See MDRC, supra note 9.
42. Issues We Focus On, MDRC, http://www.mdrc.org/issues-we-focus (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
43. See Social Impact Bond Project at Rikers Island, MDRC, http://www.mdrc.org/project/socialimpact-bond-project-rikers-island#featured_content (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
44. Chen, supra note 37.
45. Id.
46. See Design, Sites and Data Sources, Social Impact Bond Project at Rikers Island, MDRC,
http://www.mdrc.org/project/social-impact-bond-project-rikers-island#design_site_data_sources
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2013).
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III
REGULATORY QUESTIONS
Upon reading the description of the SIB model and considering the
Peterborough and Rikers Island examples, any law student who has taken a
course in securities regulation might immediately think back to the first few
days of class and wonder: Is a SIB a security? And it is easy to see why one
might believe it is a security: At first glance, it seems as if the SIB would fit
somewhere in some category of security, be it bond, note, investment contract,
or some other type. Yet, since their recent inception, SIBs have not caught the
attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or other securitiesregulating bodies. Further, upon closer inspection, SIBs do not fit as squarely
into any of the aforementioned categories of securities as might be expected.
Below, I analyze the threshold question of whether SIBs are securities, and
then, having found that they are securities, consider whether SIBs should
nonetheless be exempt from regulation.
A. Are SIBs Securities?
1. Investment Contracts
SIBs, despite being called “bonds,” are probably actually more like
47
“investment contracts” as that term is used in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
48
Corp. and its progeny. In Joiner, the Court held that divided interests in oil
rights were securities within the meaning of the securities laws:
[T]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel,
uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be
proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as “investment
49
contracts,” or as “any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’”
50

Three years later, in the seminal case of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Court
considered whether tracts of orange trees sold, accompanied by a service
contract under which the seller cultivated, harvested, and marketed the orange
crop, were investment contracts and therefore within the grasp of the federal
securities laws. Holding that the tracts were indeed securities, the Court
provided further guidance on the Joiner investment-contract category: “[A]n
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
47. SIBs are not “notes” as that term is used in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). Whereas notes
memorialize a promise to pay a sum certain, in a SIB structure the private investor is repaid only if the
program “succeeds,” success usually being defined by some benchmark of government savings resulting
from the program’s successful implementation. Even if SIBs were notes, however, they may not be
covered by the 1933 or 1934 Acts because they do not clearly satisfy the “family resemblance” test
developed in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
48. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
49. Id. at 351.
50. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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51

a third party.” Thus, after Howey, an instrument was an investment contract if
it met the four criteria of being (1) an investment of money (2) in a common
enterprise, and (3) involved an expectation of profit which was (4) derived by
52
the efforts of others. Additionally, as noted above, courts have sometimes
considered whether some comparable regulation of the putative security
53
renders application of the federal securities laws unnecessary. Though
54
subsequent cases have occasionally reformulated the Howey test in part, and
55
some states apply an altogether different test, the Howey rubric remains the
56
basic test for an investment contract.
At first glance, SIBs seem to easily meet all of the elements of the Howey
test: The traditional SIB structure involves a contract in which investors invest
money in a common social-welfare project managed by a third party, through
whose efforts the investors expect to make a profit. Even the unorthodox
Peterborough and Rikers Island examples, discussed above, arguably meet this
test on its face. Yet the Howey test has been refined in the nearly seventy years
since its inception. In the following parts of this note, I analyze SIBs under each
element of the modern formulation of the Howey test for investment contracts.
I then analyze SIBs under the alternative “risk-capital” test followed by many
states.
a. Investment of money and expectation of profit. Normally, it is fairly
evident that money has been “invested” in a security. Such was the case in
Howey, for example, wherein the purchasers were motivated by an expectation
of profits to be derived from the sale of the oranges rather than by “a desire to
57
use [the land] or consume the [oranges].” In some cases, however, purchasers
may seek not a financial return on their money, but rather some other,
nonmonetary, benefit. In these cases, it is less clear that money was invested
with the expectation of profit rather than “spent” for the consumption or

51. Id. at 298–99.
52. Though, in Howey, the Court says that profits must be derived “solely” from the efforts of
others, subsequent cases have removed this stringent requirement, making clear that profits need only
be derived “primarily” or “substantially” from the efforts of others. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters. Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. See, e.g., Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (application of securities
acts was unnecessary when the Employee Retirement Income Security Act governed the pension plan
in question); see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1982) (application of securities acts
was unnecessary when the certificate of deposit was regulated by banking laws and guaranteed by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
54. See William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual
Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 322–30 (1984).
55. Namely, the “risk-capital” test. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906
(Cal. 1961). The application of the risk-capital test to SIBs is taken up in Part III.A.1.d.
56. See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of
‘Security’: The ‘Context’ Clause, ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 489, 523 (1987) (“[T]he Court has not abandoned the Howey test in the investment contract
setting.”).
57. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975).
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enjoyment of some underlying asset. For example, in United Housing
58
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, the Court held that purchasers of shares of stock
entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a co-op had not purchased
securities as defined by the federal securities laws. The purchasers, the Court
found, “were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and
59
not by financial returns on their investments.”
In the case of SIBs, at first it appears fairly clear that investors invest their
money expecting to derive profits from their investment. Otherwise, it would
seemingly make little sense for investors to so invest; as opposed to Forman, in
which purchasers could use or “consume” a benefit generated by the underlying
assets toward which they had put their money, there seem to be few or no
opportunities to consume any similar benefit generated by the social-welfare
products in which investors have invested.
Yet, for a number of reasons, this is not always necessarily the case. First, it
is at least arguable that everyone derives some benefit from the type of socialwelfare projects typically funded by SIBs—whether the SIB is aimed at
reducing the juvenile recidivism rate, decreasing the number of homeless, or
toward some other cause. Second, if the SIB is successful, then investors—as
well as the public at large—will also benefit from decreased government
spending. Though this government savings will initially be diverted to the
investors specifically, the long-term benefits of this savings will be shared by all
within the particular government’s borders. Third, it is not always entirely clear
that SIB investors always actually expect to derive a profit from their
investment. In the Rikers Island SIB, for example, Goldman Sachs—the
principal investor—may have been equally, if not more, concerned with the
positive public relations to be derived from its role as the first investor in an
“innovative approach to harness private sector financing for important public
60
initiatives.” Indeed, even if the Rikers Island rehabilitation program is
successful—by no means an assured contingency—Goldman Sachs almost
certainly could have invested its money in a safer market, one more disposed to
hedging and other risk-avoiding techniques. Put otherwise, were there not
public-image points to be scored by investing in the risky Rikers Island SIB, one
might question whether Goldman Sachs would have done so at all. Just as the
income from the commercial space in Forman was deemed too slight to be the
61
dominant motive for the investment, it may be that Goldman Sachs’s potential
financial gains from the SIB investment were not the company’s paramount
58. Id. at 859–60.
59. Id. at 853.
60. Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of The Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs and
Corrections Commissioner Schriro Announce Nation’s First Social Impact Bond Program (Aug. 2,
2012) (statement of Lloyd Blankfein, C.E.O. of Goldman Sachs), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID
=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2
Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr285-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
61. 421 U.S. at 853.
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concern. Given that conclusions of “investment” versus “consumption” may be
62
grounded on the subjective intent of the purchaser, perhaps these
considerations weigh against the Rikers Island SIB being considered a security
under this part of the Howey test.
Despite the potential alternative motivations and benefits discussed above,
however, the fact remains that the SIB structure will always at least facially
involve an “investment of money” and “expectation of profits,” thus—in all
likelihood—satisfying these elements of the Howey investment-contract test.
And the fact that such profit might be capped or set at a fixed rate does not
63
remove SIBs from the investment-contract category.
b. Common enterprise. Courts have split over what constitutes a
64
“common enterprise” for the purposes of finding an investment contract.
Courts differ as to whether multiple investors must pool their assets
(“horizontal commonality”) or whether a profit-sharing agreement between a
65
promoter and each individual investor (“vertical commonality”) is sufficient.
Further, cases applying the vertical-commonality standard have differed as to
66
how expansive the test should be. Some courts require only “broad vertical
commonality,” wherein the success of the investors need only depend on the
67
efforts of the promoter. Other courts look to “strict vertical commonality,”
wherein the success of the investors needs to be tied to the fortunes (as opposed
68
to the efforts) of the promoter.
Further, some profit-sharing arrangements may not be investment contracts
69
at all. Such was the case in Marine Bank, in which the Court considered an
arrangement pursuant to which the investors, the Weavers, pledged a certificate
of deposit in order to secure a bank loan to a separately-owned company
(owned by the Piccirillos) in return for a share of that company’s profits as well
as the right to use the company’s facilities and to veto further borrowing by the

62. See Teague v. Bakker, No. 96-2186, 1998 WL 168876, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 1998) (rejecting
plaintiff’s claim that jury instructions were improperly based on the purchasers’ subjective motivations).
63. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 390 (2004) (“There is no reason to distinguish between
promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns for purposes of the test, so understood. In
both cases, the investing public is attracted by representations of investment income. Moreover,
investments pitched as low risk (such as those offering a “guaranteed” fixed return) are particularly
attractive to individuals more vulnerable to investment fraud, including older and less sophisticated
investors.”); see also SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 186–91 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding an
investment contract despite investors being promised a fixed rate of return ranging from 138% to
181%).
64. See Revak v. SEC Realty, 18 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the split among courts
between the “horizontal commonality” test and “vertical commonality” test).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 87.
67. See, e.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 732 (11th Cir. 2005).
68. See, e.g., SEC v. Alliance Leasing Corp., No. 89-CV-1810-J (CGA), 2000 WL 35612001, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2000), aff’d, 28 Fed. App’x. 648 (9th Cir. 2002).
69. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
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70

company. The Court held that “this unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one
71
by the parties, [was] not a security.” In so holding, the Court stressed the fact
that “[t]he unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior cases
72
involved offers to a number of potential investors, not a private transaction.”
The Court cited its language in Joiner positing that “a security is an instrument
73
in which there is ‘common trading.’” The Court further differentiated the
securities in Joiner and Howey with the putative security in Marine Bank:
Here, in contrast, the Piccirillos distributed no prospectus to the Weavers or toother
potential investors, and the unique agreement they negotiated was not designed to be
traded publicly. The provision that the Weavers could use the barn and pastures of the
slaughterhouse at the discretion of the Piccirillos underscores the unique character of
the transaction. Similarly, the provision that the Weavers could veto future loans gave
them a measure of control over the operation of the slaughterhouse not characteristic
of a security. Although the agreement gave the Weavers a share of the Piccirillo’s
profits, if any, that provision alone is not sufficient to make that agreement a
74
security.
75

Despite the language in Marine Bank suggesting otherwise, a profit-sharing
arrangement need not necessarily involve multiple investors to meet the
76
horizontal-commonality test and thus to be considered an investment contract.
In SEC v. Lauer, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that an investment
scheme that initially contemplated multiple investors remained a security
despite there ultimately being only one investor in the scheme:
[I]t is the character of the investment vehicle, not the presence of multiple investors,
that determines whether there is an investment contract. Otherwise a defrauder who
was content to defraud a single investor . . . would have immunity from the federal
securities laws. That would not make any sense, and is not contemplated by any of the
77
cases that require horizontal commonality.

In Lauer, the court’s decision was influenced by the promoters’ original intent
78
to involve multiple investors in the scheme. It is unclear whether a scheme that
contemplates only one investor from the beginning could meet the horizontal79
commonality test.
SIBs seem to meet the vertical-commonality test, at least in its broad
formulation. The typical SIB involves an investment by individual parties in
which the success of the investment is dependent upon the efforts of the
promoter. In circuits that apply the “strict-commonality” test, it is less clear
70. Id. at 552–53.
71. Id. at 560.
72. Id. at 559.
73. Id. (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).
74. Id. at 560; see also Carney, supra note 54, at 356 (arguing that the Court’s decision not to bring
privately negotiated agreements within the securities act can be justified because “[o]ne-on-one
negotiations provide no scale advantages for either party in the transaction”).
75. See id. at 559.
76. See SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (6th ed.
2009).
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whether or not SIBs would be considered to involve a common enterprise. Even
in such circuits, it might still be said that the investors’ success is tied to the
“fortunes” of the promoter—or at least the particular government entity
receiving the SIB funding—in that it is the entity’s financial savings on which
such success depends.
Most SIBs will clearly meet the horizontal-commonality test. In the
Peterborough SIB, for example, seventeen different investors “pooled” their
80
money to invest in the prisoner-intervention program. It is less clear whether
or not SIBs composed of only one investor, like the Rikers Island SIB, have the
81
requisite common enterprise to constitute an investment contract. Still, the fact
that any given SIB could involve multiple investors—and likely will involve
multiple investors as SIB use continues to become more widespread—militates
in favor of categorizing all SIBs as meeting the horizontal-commonality test.
Even more unclear is the extent to which Marine Bank weighs against any
SIB being considered an investment contract. The Rikers Island SIB, a “unique
agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties,” is seemingly the type of
82
agreement the Marine Bank Court was seeking to exclude. Yet there are
important differences between the agreement at issue in Marine Bank and the
Rikers Island SIB. One key difference is that, whereas in Marine Bank the
investor also received personal use of facilities in return for his investment,
83
Goldman Sachs ostensibly received no such direct nonfinancial benefits. Thus,
whereas the Marine Bank agreement, because of the lack of “equivalent values”
84
of some of its provisions, was seemingly “not designed to be traded publicly,”
the agreement in the Rikers Island SIB could easily be valued and traded on the
open market.
Unlike the Rikers Island SIB, not all SIBs will have only one investor, and
85
not all will be “negotiated one-on-one by the parties.” Indeed, even the
Peterborough SIB—the first SIB ever created—involved seventeen different
86
investors of different size and financial prowess. And, as SIB use continues to
become more frequent and widespread, it is easy to envision expanded SIB
participation and a wider secondary market for SIBs. If, for example, the next
SIB contemplates 500 different investors, or if SIB investment becomes open to
the general investing public, can it still be said that SIBs categorically fall under
the Marine Bank typology?

80. SOCIAL FINANCE, THE ONE* SERVICE, supra note 24, at 7.
81. See Lauer, 52 F.3d at 671 (holding that a scheme with one ultimate investor, but that initially
anticipated multiple investors, was an investment contract).
82. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1979). Note also that although parties’
sophistication and one-on-one negotiation may not remove the SIB itself from the definition of a
security, it may provide evidence that there is a transaction exemption available to the parties.
83. But see supra Part III.A.1 (discussing putative public relations and societal benefits derived by
Goldman Sachs as a result of the Rikers Island SIB investment).
84. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560.
85. Id.
86. See SOCIAL FINANCE, THE ONE* SERVICE, supra note 24, at 7.
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c. By the efforts of others. Because SIBs typically involve little-to-no
effort on the part of the passive investor, the investors’ success is usually wholly
dependent on the efforts of others. Barring the development of some hybrid
SIB in which the investor also plays a role in administering the social-welfare
program, SIBs seem to easily meet this element of the Howey test.
d. Risk-capital test. In deciding whether a particular instrument is a
security, many states do not employ the Reves or Howey test, opting instead for
the so-called risk-capital test. Although “[r]isk capital means different things to
87
different courts,” some common elements of the test can be summarized. The
“risk” element of the risk-capital test generally requires that the money
88
invested by investors be at substantial risk. Accordingly, “[t]he existence of
collateralization or other security may negate the possibility that a transaction
89
involves a security.” “Capital” generally refers to “economic capital which is
90
placed subject to the risk of loss through operation of the scheme in question.”
Thus, in the case that created the risk-capital test, Silver Hills Country Club v.
91
Sobieski, transferable country club memberships, the cost of which was used to
finance improvements in the club in order to increase membership cost, were
deemed to be securities despite giving holders no rights to the assets or income
of the club. In the Silver Hills decision, Justice Traynor distinguished the
memberships in question from traditional club memberships:
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities.
Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a business for profit.
The purchaser’s risk is not lessened merely because the interest he purchases is
labeled a membership. Only because he risks his capital along with other purchasers
92
can there be any chance that the benefits of club membership will materialize.

The risk-capital test is generally more inclusive than the Howey test. For
example, as opposed to the Howey test, the risk-capital test can be satisfied
93
without the presence of a common enterprise. Further, whereas the Howey
test requires that the expectation of profit be a substantial or primary
94
motivation of the investor, the risk-capital test generally requires only that a
95
substantial benefit—monetary or nonmonetary—be expected by the investor.
Whereas SIBs are probably securities under the more restrictive Howey test,
they are almost certainly securities under most formulations of the risk-capital

87. COX ET AL., supra note 79, at 27.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 12 JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 2:80 (2013).
91. 361 P.2d 906, 908–09 (1961).
92. Id. at 908.
93. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6[3]
(6th ed. 2009) (citing King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314 (Tenn. 2002), for the proposition that despite a lack
of common enterprise, a sale–leaseback arrangement is a security under the risk-capital test).
94. See Teague v. Bakker, No. 96-2186, 1998 WL 168876, at *2–3 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 1998).
95. See, e.g., Silver Hills, 361 P.2d at 908 (holding that the benefit of club membership was a
sufficient benefit under the risk-capital test).
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test. In the traditional SIB model, investors place capital at substantial risk with
the primary motivation of deriving a profit from that investment. That investors
may also receive some secondary benefits such as positive public relations,
improved social welfare, or a more efficient, lesser-spending government, serves
to reinforce the substantiality of the benefits potentially received by the
96
investor. Further, whereas the common-enterprise element of the Howey test
seems to weigh against SIBs like the Rikers Island SIB being considered
securities under federal law, under the risk-capital test such SIBs need not
97
employ a common enterprise to be considered securities. Though the Rikers
Island SIB, because of Bloomberg Philanthropies’ guarantee of the majority of
98
Goldman Sachs’s at-risk capital, may lack sufficient risk to be considered a
security under the risk-capital test, it is unlikely that many future SIBs will
include this type of guarantee. Thus, regardless of which category they are put
in or which test is applied, SIBs seem to constitute securities under both federal
and state securities laws.
B. Are SIBs, Seemingly Securities, Exempt from Registration?
1. Municipal Bonds
If SIBs are indeed securities under federal and state securities laws, then,
because they are always issued by government entities, they would likely be
considered a special form of securities commonly known as “municipal bonds.”
Though “[t]he term ‘municipal bonds’ embraces a multi-faceted, complex array
99
of state and local public debt,” it primarily refers to “bonds issued by state,
100
local or other political subdivisions or their agencies.”
Municipal bonds can be either “general-obligation bonds” or “revenue
bonds.” General-obligation bonds are backed by the issuing government’s
pledge of full faith and credit, including its taxing power. Today, less than half
101
of securities issued by governments are general-obligation bonds. Revenue
bonds, however, are secured only by the revenue created by the particular
project being financed. Thus, whereas investors’ returns on general-obligation
bonds are nearly guaranteed, their returns on revenue bonds are far less secure.
As demonstrated by New York City’s near default on its obligations in the
102
1970s, however, even general-obligation bonds may involve an element of
96. It is interesting to consider whether or not such nonmonetary benefits alone would be
sufficient to satisfy the “benefit” element of the risk-capital test. Though cases like Silver Hills allow for
nonmonetary benefits, the members’ enjoyment of the club facilities seems to be a more directly felt
benefit than the incidental nonmonetary benefits potentially received by SIB investors.
97. See HAZEN, supra note 93, (“[T]he elements of the risk capital test can be satisfied even
though the investment does not involve a common enterprise.”).
98. See Chen, supra note 37 (noting that Bloomberg Philanthropies guaranteed $7.2 million of
Goldman’s $9.6 million investment).
99. HAZEN, supra note 93, § 14.6[1] n.1 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3 (1975)).
100. Id. § 14.6[1].
101. COX ET AL., supra note 79, at 435.
102. See generally SUBCOMM. ON ECON. STABILIZATION OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. &
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risk.
Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act exempts from the Act’s
registration requirements “[a]ny security issued or guaranteed by the United
States or any territory thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or by any State of
the United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or territory, or by
103
any public instrumentality of one or more States or territories.” Accordingly,
such securities need not be registered with the SEC prior to issuance, though
104
the antifraud provisions of section 17 of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the
105
1934 Act still apply. Furthermore, pursuant to SEC Rule 15c, a complex
regulation enacted in 1975, brokers and dealers in municipal securities must
provide some disclosure when initially offering municipal securities of over $1
106
million to the public. Though ostensibly providing some regulation of
municipal securities, these disclosure obligations “ha[ve] been criticized as
107
inadequate.”
And issuers of municipal securities need not make any
108
disclosures in offering securities.
There are a number of different justifications for the exemption of
government securities from the 1933 Act’s registration requirements. Some are
based on suppositions that governments typically do not lie or default on their
debt obligations. Additionally, it is has sometimes been argued that registration
URBAN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 95TH CONG., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Comm.
Print 1977) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. ON ECON. STABILIZATION OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. &
URBAN AFFAIRS, STAFF REPORT]; Final Report in the Matter of Transactions in the Securities of the
City of New York, Securities Act Release No. 6021, 16 SEC Docket 951 (Feb. 5, 1979) [hereinafter
Final Report].
103. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (2006). This provision also exempts from
registration requirements “industrial development bonds,” which, in some ways, are like SIBs. See
Industrial Development Revenue Bond Program, CAL. INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECON. DEV. BANK,
http://www.ibank.ca.gov/industrial_dev_bonds.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) (“Industrial
Development Bonds (IDBs) are tax-exempt securities issued . . . by a governmental entity to provide
money for the acquisition, construction, rehabilitation and equipping of manufacturing and processing
facilities for private companies.”).
104. Id. § 77q.
105. Id. § 78j.
106. See, e.g., Dennis L. Holsapple & Curtis L. Christensen, SEC Rule 15c2–12 and Ongoing
Disclosure Obligations on Municipal Securities, 27 URB. LAW. 943 (1995). Pursuant to section 15B of
the Exchange Act, municipal securities brokers and dealers must register with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. §
78o–4 (2006). A “municipal securities dealer” is “any person . . . engaged in the business of buying and
selling municipal securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30)
(2006). A “municipal securities broker” is “a broker engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
municipal securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(31) (2006).
107. HAZEN, supra note 93, § 14.6[1]; see also Lisa M. Fairchild & Nan S. Ellis, Municipal Bond
Disclosure: Remaining Inadequacies of Mandatory Disclosure under Rule 15c–12, 23 J. CORP. L. 439,
461 (1998) (arguing that “a number of weaknesses” in the regulations “impede the achievement” of the
goal of disclosure).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78o–4(d)(1) (2006). Various attempts at requiring disclosure by issuers of
municipal securities have been made, however, including the Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act
of 1976, which was introduced by Senator Harrison Williams first in February 1976 and again in 1977.
See Mun. Sec. Full Disclosure Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2969 and S. 2574 Before the Subcomm. on Sec.
of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976).
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is unnecessary because of the sophistication of the typical investor in municipal
109
that imposing registration requirements on governments or
bonds,
municipalities would impose an undue burden on them that would impair their
110
ability to raise public funds for specified purposes, and that municipal
securities are less subject to speculation because they are usually held for
111
investment, rather than speculative, objectives.
Yet these explanations sometimes fail to justify the exemption of particular
municipal securities. For example, in 1996 the SEC brought enforcement
actions against the then bankrupt City of Orange County, California, alleging
112
fraud in its sale of over $2 billion in municipal securities. Similarly, in 2002 and
2003 the SEC brought action against the City of San Diego, alleging fraud in its
failure to disclose underfunding of its pension plan in connection with the sale
113
of $260 million in municipal bonds.
Even absent fraud, there are many instances of municipalities defaulting on
bonds offered to the public. In the mid-1980s, the Washington Public Power
114
Supply System defaulted on more than $2 billion in its securities. A decade
earlier, New York City nearly defaulted on its own debt obligations thanks, in
115
part, to questionable accounting by city officials. Most recently, bankrupt
Detroit defaulted on more than $600 million of unsecured general-obligation
116
bonds.
Further, the perception that investors in municipal bonds are largely
sophisticated is false. As of 2009, approximately one-third of municipal debt
117
was held by individual households. This figure does not take into account the
municipal bonds individuals hold indirectly through their ownership of mutual
118
funds or money-market funds.

109. See Robert W. Doty & John E. Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in
Municipal Securities, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 325 (1976) (“At the inception of securities regulation, it
had been argued that municipal bonds were bought primarily by sophisticated investors, who had little
need for protection against the abuses that had occurred in the corporate area.”).
110. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 14.6[1] (citing Bruce N. Hawthorne, Note, Municipal Bonds, and
the Federal Securities Laws: The Results of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 561,
583–85 (1975)).
111. See id.
112. County of Orange, California, Exchange Act Release No. 36760, 61 SEC Docket 310 (Jan. 24,
1996); Report of Investigation, County of Orange, California, Exchange Act Release No. 36761, 61
SEC Docket 382 (Jan. 24, 1996).
113. City of San Diego, Exchange Act Release No. 54745, 2006 WL 3298665 (Nov. 14, 2006).
114. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION IN THE MATTER OF TRANSACTIONS IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY
SYSTEM SECURITIES 1 (Sept. 1988).
115. See SUBCOMM. ON ECON. STABILIZATION OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. & URBAN
AFFAIRS, STAFF REPORT, supra note 102; see also Final Report, supra note 102.
116. Detroit Defaults on $600 Million of Unsecured Bonds, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-10-01/business/42577887_1_u-s-bank-kevyn-orr-debt.
117. COX ET AL., supra note 79, at 435–36.
118. Id. at 436.
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Like other securities, it is clear that municipal bonds (especially revenue
bonds) subject investors (who are often unsophisticated individuals) to a high
degree of risk. And SIBs, which are not really bonds contemplating a fixed
return, but rather a sort of investment contract typically contemplating a
contingent return, are no different. A number of factors make SIBs especially
risky: The infancy of the SIB model provides both investors and issuers with
little guidance as to the SIB’s administration; the social-welfare projects being
funded, inherently risky, are often relatively untested before the SIB is
implemented; and evaluation of the success of the SIB depends on
mathematical analysis by third-party evaluators and is subject to bias,
inaccuracy, and fraud.
Although there are similarities between SIBs and municipal revenue bonds,
certain differences between the two instruments present additional questions
about how SIBs would be regulated under current law. For example, SIBs, at
least in their current makeup, do not include a role for underwriters (though
that role could easily develop) and instead depend on intermediaries such as
MDRC to solicit investors and oversee the social-welfare program. The extent
to which SIB intermediaries are subject to regulation is extremely unclear. SIB
intermediaries would appear to fall under the definition of “municipal securities
broker[s]” in section 15B of the 1934 Act, which defines that term as a “broker
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in municipal securities for the
119
120
account of others.” Such brokers must register with the SEC and are
121
governed by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). Further,
the MSRB has promulgated a number of important rules governing securities
122
brokers. For example, rule G-2 requires that municipal securities brokers
123
meet certain qualification standards set out in rule G-3. These qualifications
124
are nuanced, but include certain personnel and expertise requirements as well
125
as net-capital requirements. It is unlikely that SIB intermediaries such as
MDRC—primarily concerned with implementation and statistical evaluation of
social-welfare projects and largely unfamiliar with securities laws—would ever
meet these complex and stringent standards. One might question the extent to
which such financially disinterested intermediaries should be subject to the
126
disclosure obligations imposed by SEC Rule 15c2–12. Yet, because issuers of

119. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(31) (2006).
120. Id. § 78o–4.
121. Id.
122. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD. R. G-2, available at http://www.msrb.org/Rules-andInterpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-2.aspx.
123. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD. R. G-3, available at http://www.msrb.org/Rules-andInterpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-3.aspx.
124. See id.
125. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
126. Notably, Rule 15c2-12 does allow for some exemptions based on the size and duration of the
offering and the expertise of the investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d).
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municipal securities are free from disclosure requirements, exempting SIB
intermediaries from disclosure requirements would result in no mandated
disclosure regarding SIB issuances.
2. Nonprofit and Charitable Securities
Like municipal bonds, securities of nonprofit issuers are exempt from
registration requirements. Section 3(a)(4) defines such a security as “[a]ny
security issued by a person organized and operated exclusively for religious,
educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not
for pecuniary profit, and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
128
benefit of any person, private stockholder, or individual.” Though not
explicitly stated in the statute, the second part of the exemption regarding the
inurement of benefits refers to persons, stakeholders, or individuals who have a
stake in the organization or are somehow connected with the organization, not
129
to the purchasers of securities. Thus, for a security to be exempt under section
3(a)(4), it must be issued by a nonprofit organization and its net earnings
cannot inure to anyone who has a stake in that organization.
There are two primary policy justifications for the nonprofit exemption.
First, subjecting nonprofit organizations to the rigors of registration may limit
their ability to raise capital for their objective. Second, the nonprofit-issuer
exemption is based on the assumption that “[a]rguably, individuals do not
‘invest’ in eleemosynary organizations and therefore are not in need of
extensive disclosures about the economic aspects of the operations of such
130
issuers.” Although the first policy justification applies equally to SIBs as to
traditional municipal securities, the second justification—that investors in
securities of nonprofit organizations do not have the same investment concerns
as investors in securities of for-profit issuers—does not withstand scrutiny under
the SIB model, which is designed to attract investors primarily by the potential
131
for profit to be earned.
First, however, is the tricky question of whether SIBs are indeed nonprofit
securities as defined in section 3(a)(4). Because they are exempt under a
separate subsection of section 3(a), municipal securities are not expressly
covered by section 3(a)(4), and courts have not considered whether a security
issued by a governmental entity but somehow not qualified for exemption
under section 3(a)(2) might qualify for exemption under section 3(a)(4). But,

127. HAZEN, supra note 93, § 14.6[4].
128. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (2006).
129. See SEC v. Children’s Hosp., 214 F. Supp. 883, 890–91 (D. Ariz. 1963) (“The clause . . . must be
construed to encompass profit . . . whether such profit inures to anyone directly or indirectly connected
with the corporation.”).
130. COX ET AL., supra note 79, at 432.
131. As SIB use becomes more widespread and less notable, the nonpecuniary benefits of investing
in a SIB, such as the favorable public relations ostensibly sought by Goldman Sachs in the Rikers Island
SIB, see discussion supra Part III.A.1.a, are likely to become secondary to the potential financial gain
SIBs promise.
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because the municipal-securities status of SIBs is questionable, this may be the
exemption path that SIB issuers would need to take. In assessing the
applicability of the nonprofit exemption to SIBs, one must consider both the
nature of the issuing entity and the nature of those to whom revenues from the
security inure.
Were they not also typically government entities, SIB issuers would
seemingly qualify for exemption as nonprofit issuers under section 3(a)(4).
Indeed, the essence of government is that it is organized for the purposes of
those whom it governs and “not for pecuniary profit.” That the capital raised by
the securities typically goes to a specific purpose—be it prison reform,
healthcare, or something else—reinforces the nonprofit or charitable aspect of
the SIB and more closely aligns it to the traditional nonprofit securities exempt
under section 3(a)(4).
More difficult is the question of whether the benefits of a SIB “inure” to
132
members of the issuing party. In SEC v. Children’s Hospital, a seminal case on
the nonprofit exemption, the court deemed bonds issued by a to-be-built
hospital not eligible for the nonprofit exclusion because the promoters of the
bonds (who were also directors of the hospital) stood to receive profits from
construction of the hospital. Although the benefit to be received by the
promoters in Children’s Hospital was large, a benefit of any size and type may
disqualify a putative nonprofit security from exemption. For example, in 1988,
the SEC refused to issue a no-action letter requested by a Christian ministry
133
seeking to offer bonds to fund a building renovation. The SEC based its
decision on the fact that one of the buildings to be renovated housed (free of
charge) members of the organization who provided drug rehabilitation and
134
other services to patrons of the ministry. Thus, the SEC reasoned, the
members might inure a benefit (renovated housing) from the earnings of the
135
security.
In the SIB model, the revenues of the SIB arguably always go to
stakeholders of the issuer. This is because those for whom the social-welfare
projects are designed are citizens of, and therefore stakeholders in, the very
governments issuing the securities to fund the projects. Thus, in the SIB model,
the recipients of social-welfare initiatives such as drug rehabilitation and
housing assistance are somewhat like the members of the Jesus People Ministry,
136
having derived benefit from the funds being financed. Further, every citizen of
a SIB-offering government arguably receives an indirect benefit of reduced
taxes from reduced government spending. Obviously, because of the
governmental nature of the SIB issuer, the section 3(a)(4) test for nonprofit

132. 214 F. Supp. 883.
133. See Jesus People U.S.A.—Full Gospel Ministries, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235026, at
*1, *3 (Oct. 13, 1988).
134. See COX ET AL., supra note 79, at 465–66.
135. See id.
136. See id.

5 HUMPHRIES (DO NOT DELETE)

452

3/19/2014 11:39 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:433

securities is an inappropriate test for assessing the nonprofit nature of the SIB.
Consequently, in the event that a SIB issuer fails to qualify for the municipal
security exemption, it should seek a no-action letter before relying on the
section 3(a)(4) exemption.
IV
CONCLUSION
SIBs are promising new financial instruments that infuse a for-profit ethos
into important, but often underfunded and inefficient, social-welfare programs.
Yet precisely because of the great potential for more widespread use of SIBs,
some regulation of the SIB marketplace is necessary. It is unclear which
category of securities—if any—SIBs fit in: SIBs are unique in that they have
characteristics of investment contracts, municipal securities, and nonprofit
securities, each of which has its own set of regulations and requirements.
Despite SIBs’ security-like characteristics, application of the stringent securities
fraud provisions that govern the trade of traditional securities seems
inappropriate in the SIB context, where issuers and intermediaries often lack
securities-law experience and expertise. Thus, SIBs may require a new, lighthanded set of regulations that will simultaneously ensure the optimization of
public SIB investment and reduce the likelihood of fraud in the offering of SIBs
and the implementation of the projects that they fund. Such regulations would
add an air of legitimacy to the SIB marketplace and encourage responsible
utilization of the SIB vehicle.
Perhaps, in a future world, sufficient SIB regulation will enable novice,
small-scale, investors to safely invest in SIBs as an alternative to making
charitable donations or other philanthropic expenditures. In such a world, the
general investing public will gain a new interest in the development and success
of social-welfare projects for those in need, and everyone will benefit as a result.

